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Emerging Market Liberalization and the Impact on Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 
 
 
A large number of studies has examined the impact of liberalization on the integration of 
emerging markets (see, e.g., Bekaert (1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Korajczyk (1996), and 
Hunter (2002)).  Although providing important insights regarding the success or lack thereof of 
the integration policies of these countries, these studies have in general focused only on 
integration of equity markets, neglecting other financial markets.  This focus on equity markets 
suggests that researchers are implicitly making the assumption that integration of equity markets 
implies integration of other financial markets.  It is usual for researchers simply to assume that 
currency markets are integrated.  For instance, both Dumas and Solnik (1995) and De Santis and 
Gerard (1998) assume that currency and equity markets are internationally integrated and impose 
the same price of world equity market risk on portfolios of equities and foreign currency 
deposits.  
A fundamental relationship in international finance is interest rate parity.  It states that 
when the domestic interest rate is less than the foreign interest rate the domestic currency is 
expected to appreciate by an amount approximately equal to the interest rate differential.  An 
implication of this known as the uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP), is that the return on an 
uncovered foreign currency deposit should be equal to the return on an equivalent domestic 
deposit regardless of the national market within which the foreign deposit is located.  A violation 
of this relationship indicates that capital markets are not integrated (see, e.g., Frankel 
(1992,1993) and Montiel (1993)).   In this paper we investigate if the liberalization of emerging markets has led to the 
integration of their currency markets into the world capital market.  We take the perspective of a 
U.S. investor and examine the extent to which the liberalization of emerging financial markets 
impacted the deviation from UIRP.  Many studies of UIRP (these focus primarily on the 
developed markets) find that, in general, UIRP does not hold (see Engel (1996) for a survey).  
One of the more prominent explanations for this failure is the existence of a time-varying risk 
premium as a compensation for the speculative position in the foreign currency.
1  We argue 
below that, if deviation from UIRP is due to a risk premium, then a fortiori these deviations will 
exist in the emerging markets in the pre-liberalization period.  On the other hand, if financial 
market liberalization has been successful in integrating developing countries’ currency markets 
into the international capital market, then in the post-liberalization period U.S. investors will not 
require a risk premium in the returns on currency deposits in the emerging markets.  Hence, there 
should be no systematic component to the deviation from UIRP.  Given our objective, we 
necessarily focus on the time-varying risk premium explanation of deviations from UIRP and are 
in general silent about other possible explanations. 
We focus on the integration of emerging currency markets into the world capital market 
for several reasons.  First, Frankel (1992,1993), Montiel (1993), De Brouwer (1997), and others, 
stress the importance of the integration of currency markets for the integration of emerging 
financial markets into the world capital market.  As noted by Frankel (1992,1993), only interest 
rate parity tests can be interpreted unambiguously as tests of integration of a country’s financial 
markets.  In other words, the design of unequivocal tests of capital market integration based on 
equity markets has proven elusive (e.g., Montiel (1993)).  Thus, given that the impact of capital 
                                                 
1 Other explanations include, inefficient currency forward markets, rational learning about potential changes in 
  2market liberalization on the degree of integration of emerging markets currency markets is yet to 
be determined, claims of financial market integration following capital market liberalization may 
be premature (see, e.g., Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2001)).  Second, as we show in Table 
1, the liberalization of the emerging financial markets was designed to affect other areas of the 
capital markets (see, e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (1998), Beim and Calomiris (2001), Bekaert et al. 
(2002)).  Thus examining the impact of liberalization on other financial markets is important to 
ascertain the success of these policies.   
The importance of this study is further supported by the intense debate over the 
appropriate response of the governing authorities to emerging market currency crises.  One 
frequently advocated response is the reintroduction of capital controls.
2  However, Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2001) document the vacillation in policy regarding capital controls in six important 
emerging markets and raise doubts about their efficacy.  An alternative policy tool at the disposal 
of governments responding to currency crises is the implementation of fixed exchange rates (e.g., 
Malaysia after the Asian crisis).  The scope for a successful “interest rate defense” of a fixed 
exchange rate depends on the extent of the deviation from interest rate parity (e.g., Flood and 
Rose (2001)).  
An additional benefit of this study is that, given the investment interest in the emerging 
markets, investigating the behavior of excess returns on currency deposits provides an interesting 
complement to the studies that have focused on the diversification benefits of investing in 
equities (e.g., Bailey and Stulz (1990), Harvey (1995), and others)).  Interestingly, Malliaropulos 
                                                                                                                                                             
currency regimes, speculative bubbles, and the “peso” problem causing bias in the forward rate (e.g., Engel (1996)).  
2 For example, the World Bank’s former chief economist Joseph Stiglitz (Int’l Herald Tribune April 10-11, 1999, p. 
6), Paul Krugman (Fortune, September 7, 1998, 74-80), and others, have suggested that emerging markets should 
reimpose restrictions on capital flows. See http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/capcontrols.htm for information 
on the debate about capital controls. 
  3(1997) finds that expected excess returns of foreign currency deposits are less volatile than that 
of equities and that the addition of dollar deposits to an international equity portfolio can provide 
additional diversification benefits to non-U.S. investors.  Similarly, Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) 
find that adding emerging market currency returns to those from developed markets results in 
higher Sharpe ratios. 
As stated previously, most of the work on interest rate parity has focused on the 
industrialized markets.  However, we believe that deviations from UIRP in emerging markets are 
likely to be larger and more persistent than in industrialized markets.  Recent work by Flood and 
Rose (2001) and Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) find that UIRP is different across developed and 
emerging markets.  Flood and Rose do not find support for UIRP and indicate that the foreign 
exchange premium is larger for emerging markets than for developed markets.  In contrast, 
Bansal and Dahlquist find that although UIRP does not hold for most countries, it tends to hold 
more frequently in low-income and emerging markets than developed economies.  
Interestingly, Bansal and Dahlquist also find that when there is deviation from UIRP for 
lower-income industrialized economies it is not caused by the existence of a risk premium.  They 
note that country-specific attributes such as the level and volatility of inflation rate, income level, 
and country ratings are important in explaining foreign currency excess returns.  Industrialized 
markets typically have lower and less volatile inflation and interest rates, more stable exchange 
rates, and higher income levels than emerging economies.  Given these differences, we expect 
that emerging markets will have significantly larger currency excess returns than industrialized 
economies, even if these excess returns are not compensation for risk. 
Furthermore, theoretical work by Aliber (1973) finds that deviation from interest rate 
parity is a function of both currency and political risks.  The latter relate to the uncertainty that in 
  4the future a foreign government will impose restrictions on capital flows (see, also, Dooley and 
Isard (1980)).  In light of a long history of vacillation in the policy towards capital flows (see, 
e.g., Beim and Calomiris (2001)) and the above-mentioned debate about the appropriate response 
to recent currency crises, this risk should be greater in the developing economies and should give 
rise to significant deviations from UIRP, especially in the pre-liberalization period.
3 
Our analysis proceeds in two stages.  In the first stage we examine if UIRP holds for our 
sample of emerging markets.  In the second stage, for those markets where UIRP does not hold, 
we investigate whether liberalization reduces the risk premium in excess currency returns.  If 
emerging market liberalization leads to the integration of emerging financial markets (Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2001)), then we expect to find no 
significant risk premium in the post-liberalization period.   
We use a multifactor conditional asset pricing model to examine the extent to which 
emerging market currency excess returns can be explained by systematic risk factors and 
therefore can be attributed to time-varying risk premia.  This approach is similar in spirit to 
several studies that have examined the risk-premium explanation of deviations from interest rate 
parity (see, e.g., Kaminsky and Peruga (1990), McCurdy and Morgan (1991), Chiang (1991), 
Korajczyk and Viallet (1992), Malliaropulos (1997), and Morley and Pentecost (1998)).  An 
important difference between these papers and ours is that we focus on emerging markets 
whereas these earlier studies use data from industrialized countries.  More important, we 
investigate changes in the risk premium as a result of market liberalization.  
We find that, in general, deviation from UIRP in emerging markets is systematic in 
nature and that a significant part of emerging market currency excess returns is attributable to 
                                                 
3 This would be consistent with the fact that emerging market equity returns provide investors with a compensation 
  5time-varying risk premium.  Importantly we also find that these countries’ currency deposits 
provide U.S. (equity) investors the benefits of international diversification.  Additionally, our 
results show that for some markets, liberalization improved (worsened) investors’ perception of 
growth opportunity while reducing (increasing) investors’ perception of the probability of 
financial distress.  Finally, while several countries benefited from liberalization and have become 
more integrated into the world capital market, the experience is country specific.  
The remainder of the paper has five sections.  Section 2 describes the channels through 
which liberalization impacts risk premium in currency excess returns.  Section 3 describes the 
methodology.  In section 4 we present summary statistics of the data and preliminary evidence 
on the extent to which UIRP holds.  Section 5 contains the main empirical results.  Section 6 
summarizes and suggests further research. 
 
2.  Risk Premium and Liberalization  
Market liberalization can impact UIRP through two basic channels, the exchange rate 
and/or nominal interest rates (and the correlation between both, especially as correlation is 
affected by changes in the rate of inflation). Emerging market liberalization was driven by 
“…fundamental structural changes…” including the elimination of exchange controls, 
stabilization of exchange rates, control of inflation, removal of restrictions on capital inflows and 
outflows, removal of interest rate restrictions, and sovereign debt reduction coupled with the use 
of private debt and equity (e.g., Mullin (1993)). Taken together, these changes are expected to 
have a direct and significant effect on U.S. investors’ perception of the need for a risk premium 
                                                                                                                                                             
for bearing political risk (see, e.g., Bailey and Chang (1995)). 
  6in the returns on currency deposits in the emerging markets. Liberalization should therefore 
impact the deviation from UIRP.  
There are several means by which liberalization can affect interest rate parity via the 
currency channel.  First, countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Jordan, Mexico, and Taiwan 
included the reduction of exchange controls and/or freely floating currencies as an important 
component of financial market liberalization (see, e.g., Kim and Singal (2000), Bekaert and 
Harvey (1998) and Bekaert (1995)).  Others such as Mexico and Thailand have been forced to 
abandon fixed exchange rate regimes in the post-liberalization period.  Arguably, either path to 
floating foreign exchange rates has contributed to more volatile currencies.  If excess returns on 
emerging market currencies is compensation for systematic risks, and if a component of this risk 
premium is for exposure to the (low) probability of a currency crash, then with the increasing 
frequency and intensity of currency crises in the post-liberalization period this compensation 
might have increased, rather than declined, over time. Hence, liberalization might have increased 
the deviation from UIRP.  
However, even in the absence of currency crises in the emerging markets we would 
expect that the extent to which UIRP holds changes over time as liberalization takes effect. 
Specifically, as restrictions are reduced (and are so perceived by foreign investors) the financial 
markets of the emerging economies will move more closely with the international capital 
markets, reducing the potential for earning excess returns on foreign currency deposits.
4  
Further, the post-liberalization increase in private physical investments (Henry (2000)) 
and higher economic growth rates (Bekaert et al. (2000)) experienced by the emerging markets 
                                                 
4 This is similar to the argument that increasing integration of emerging equity markets will reduce the benefits of 
diversification. It is also consistent with the argument that the potential for future capital controls is reduced as the 
  7can stabilize and strengthen currencies. In the absence of a commensurate decline in interest 
rates, this would lead to an increase in the excess returns (and hence, deviations from UIRP) on 
emerging market currency deposits.  
With regard to the potential impact of liberalization on interest rates, evidence presented 
by Henry (2000), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Kim and Singal (2000), and others, indicates that 
there has been a reduction in the cost of capital subsequent to liberalization. However, Chari and 
Henry (2001) point out that this reduction may be related solely to an increase in risk sharing in 
the formerly restricted emerging markets and not to a reduction in the risk-free component of the 
cost of capital.  If liberalization followed a period of artificially low interest rates and 
liberalization was accompanied by domestic financial deregulation and/or increased freedom of 
emerging market residents to invest abroad, then domestic interest rates may increase (Henry 
(2000), Basak (1996)). On the other hand, if market liberalization followed a period of relatively 
scarce capital and high interest rates in the emerging market, then with unrestricted inflows there 
is expected to be a decline in interest rates. Hence, the net impact of liberalization on emerging 
market interest rates and in turn the impact of interest rates on UIRP is an empirical question. 
 
3. Methodology   
Previous studies that use an asset pricing model to examine if deviation from UIRP is due 
to systematic risk factors (see, e.g., Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), Malliaropulos (1997), 
McCurdy and Morgan (1991)) have in general met with limited success in explaining currency 
excess returns as compensation for systematic risk.  A possible explanation for this lack of 
success is that most of these models are single-factor models.  This possibility arises because in 
                                                                                                                                                             
emerging markets increasingly embrace open (financial and economic) market policies. This lower political risk 
  8an international setting the single-factor asset pricing model holds only under very strict 
assumptions, and as such its application might have affected previous results (see, e.g., Engel 
(1996)).
5 To overcome this weakness of previous studies we use a multi-factor conditional asset 
pricing model estimated in a multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) framework.  
  The expected returns on each foreign currency deposit in excess of the U.S. returns on a 
similar deposit is modeled as a product of the conditional betas of the return on the foreign 
currency deposit (relative to each of three systematic risk factors), and the conditionally expected 
realization of the factors.  We use factors that have been used in the literature to explain equity 
returns and have been argued that they are also valid for currency returns.  For example, 
Korajczyk and Viallet (1992), among others, argue that the same pervasive factors that explain 
excess returns on equities should explain the variation in the risk premia in forward exchange 
markets.  Asset pricing models employed by Dumas and Solnik (1995) and De Santis and Gerard 
(1998), among others, successfully use equity benchmarks to price excess returns on foreign 
currency deposits.  Ikeda (1991) shows that a linear factor model in local currency terms (i.e., the 
local currency APT of Ross (1976)) does not hold internationally unless the same factor-pricing 
model governs both equities and exchange rates.  
In our investigation of whether deviation from UIRP can be attributed to time-varying 
risk premium, we take the position of a domestic (U.S.) investor.  Consequently, we only use 
domestic risk factors in our estimation.  Specifically, we use the Fama-French three-factor model 
where the factors are the returns on the U.S. value-weighted market portfolio in excess of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
reduces the probability of deviations from interest rate parity (see, e.g., Dooley and Isard (1980)).  
5 The single-factor model holds under the assumptions of strict purchasing power parity, logarithmic utility 
functions, or zero correlation between exchange rate changes and stock returns (e.g., Adler and Dumas, (1983)). 
  9risk-free rate (rMt), the returns on the “size” factor (rSMBt) that is an arbitrage portfolio formed 
from going long in small stocks and short in large capitalization stocks, and the returns on the 
“book-to-market” portfolio (rHMLt) that is an arbitrage portfolio formed from going long in stocks 
with a high book-to-market value and short in stocks with a low book-to-market value (Fama and 
French (1993)). The recent success of this model in pricing U.S. equities and the finding by 
Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2001) that the factors are correlated with investors’ investment 
opportunity set lead us to believe that they may price returns on foreign currency deposits. 
Moreover, Empirical tests by McCurdy and Morgan (1991), Korajczyk and Viallet (1992), 
among others, find that excess returns on foreign currencies have a component that is not 
explained by the single- (equity) factor model.   
It is a well-known fact that many of the emerging markets have experienced at one time 
or another debt crisis. As a result U.S. investor might require a risk premium for the exposure to 
this risk. The SMB factor, which is generally regarded as a financial distress factor (Fama and 
French (1993)), should be able to capture this if in fact U.S. investors demand such a premium.  
It should be noted that, because of the frequency and severity of emerging market currency crises 
in the post-liberalization period, U.S. investors might extract a larger premium relative to the 
period before liberalization.  Additionally, Liew and Vassalou (2002) find that both HML and 
SMB are positively related to future GDP, suggesting that these factors forecast future growth 
opportunities.  Hence, these factors may capture any risk premium that U.S. investors charge for 
the uncertainty of local business and political conditions that could reduce the probability of 
repatriating their investments in the foreign country.   
  10To capture the time-varying risk premia of excess returns on currency deposits both the 
betas and the factors are allowed to vary over time. The model to be estimated has the following 
specification:  
   .                             (1)  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 HMLt t iHMLt SMBt t iSMBt Mt t iMt t r E r E r E it r E − − − − − − − + + = β β β
In this model   is the conditionally expected return (conditioned on information up to t-1) 
on the ith currency position in excess of the return on the equivalent U.S. asset. βt-1 is the 
conditional beta, measured as the ratio of the conditional covariance (covt-1[•]) and the 
conditional variance (vart-1[•]),  , where  j is equal to factor rM, rSMB, and 
rHML, respectively.  
) ( 1 it t r E −
] [ var / ] , [ cov 1 1 jt t jt it t r r r − −
To estimate the conditional factors we use a system of equations where the (rational) 
expectations in equation (1) are replaced by the actual realization of each factor minus its 
conditionally mean-zero forecast error term (εt). The conditional betas are replaced by the 
conditional covariance between the currency deposit excess returns and the realization of each 
factor, divided by the conditional variance of the factor. These are obtained from the conditional 
variance-covariance matrix of the multivariate GARCH process. For ease of notation we 
represent the covariance between currency deposit i and factor j as hij and the variance of factor j 
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In equation (2), the realized excess return on the currency deposit is estimated as a product of the 
conditional betas and the expected returns on the factors. In equations (3) to (5), a vector of 
instruments is used to predict the factors. These include a constant, the change in the U.S. default 
premium measured as the yield differential between Moody’s Baa and AAA corporate bonds 
(∆DEFAULT), the U.S. term premium (TERM) measured as the difference in yield between the 
10-year Treasury note and the three-month Treasury bill, the risk-free rate (RFREE) measured as 
the return on the one-month Treasury bill, and the U.S. market portfolio. Each instrument is 
lagged one period relative to the factor returns.   
Asset pricing theories do not specify how conditional second moments should be 
modeled and in the present paper we do not attempt to specify an equilibrium economic model of 
the covariance matrix.  Instead, we draw on the considerable evidence in the literature that asset 
prices in general, and exchange rates in particular, are characterized by ARCH effects (see, e.g., 
Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992)).  Further, several previous examinations of UIRP have 
used a GARCH framework (see, e.g., the survey by Engel (1996)).  Hence, the variance-
covariance matrix is parameterized using the GARCH (1,1) specification of the diagonal BEKK 
model (Engle and Kroner (1995)). This is achieved as follows. Form a system containing the 
realized returns on the currency deposit and the realization of the three factors and estimate 
equations (2) to (5). Let et represent a 4×1 vector containing the residuals from these equations 
and assume that they are conditionally mean-zero and normally distributed; i.e., . 
Then equation (6) models the 4×4 variance-covariance matrix of the system Ht as a function of a 
) , ( ~   1 t t H 0 N e −
  12constant, lagged error terms, and lagged variance-covariance terms. In this paper we specify A1, 
B1 as diagonal matrices.  Hence, there is no “volatility spillover” among the respective variance 
and covariance processes. That is, each process is dependent on its own lagged values. This is 
reasonable given that at the monthly interval there is usually only very limited cross-variable 
interaction. De Santis and Gerard (1997, 1998), and others, have successfully used this 
specification, to generate the requisite dynamics of the variance-covariance matrix. C is a 4×4 
upper-triangle matrix of constants; hence, positive definiteness of Ht is guaranteed.  
Because normality is not frequently observed in financial markets data the estimation 
uses a quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) approach (e.g., Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992)), 
where the log-likelihood function from the conditional normal specification is maximized, but 
the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients is made robust to the error distribution. This 
allows for regular statistical inferences. An additional advantage of the QML estimation is that 
hypotheses tests based on the Wald test are also robust to the non-normality.  
 
4.   The Data 
 
We use country level data to test if a time series of excess currency returns can be 
explained by systematic risks. We study Chile, Colombia, Mexico, India, Korea, Pakistan, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Turkey using monthly data over the period 1980 to 2000.  We use bank 
deposit rates and inter-bank rates when information on deposit rates is not available. These rates 
are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
Testing whether financial liberalization affects UIRP requires establishing the date of 
each country’s capital market liberalization.  Liberalization dates for the nine countries examined 
  13in this study are obtained from Bekaert and Campbell (2000) and are reported in column 1 of 
Panel A in Table 1.  As is shown, the capital market liberalization for each of the countries in our 
sample occurred in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.    Although others (see, e.g., Henry (2000), 
and Kim and Singal (2000)) have, in general, confirmed these dates several caveats are in order.  
First the act of liberalization for most of the countries did not occur at a specific point in time, 
but rather over a period of time.  Second, although limited in nature, most of these countries 
capital markets were open in one form or another prior to the formal liberalization date.  Third, 
the investment restrictions that were in place were not binding for most of these countries (see, 
e.g., Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) for some interesting examples).  The importance of these 
caveats is that the impact of liberalization on the deviation from UIRP for the current sample 
may be confounded.   
  Table 2, Panel A, presents summary statistics for the excess currency returns series for 
both the pre- and post-liberalization sub-periods.  Panel B reports the autocorrelation for the pre-
liberalization period, while Panel C contains the autocorrelation statistics for the post 
liberalization period. 
  Column 3 of Panel A contains the mean excess returns (percent per month).  For each 
country two numbers are reported. The top number represents the average excess currency return 
for the pre-liberalization period while the number below corresponds to the post-liberalization 
period.  Several noteworthy features are apparent.  First, for each country the pre-liberalization 
period is characterized by negative excess currency returns and ranges from a high of -1.114 for 
Mexico to a low of -0.068 for Korea.  That is, on average these countries experienced large 
enough depreciations and/or had relatively low interest rates such that U.S. investors would have 
suffered a net loss had they invested in the currencies of these emerging markets. The finding 
  14that over this period Korea had the smallest average deviation from UIRP is not surprising given 
that over this period Korea had the most developed capital market of the countries examined in 
this study.  For the post-liberalization period the results are dramatically different with five out of 
the nine countries displaying positive excess returns and for the others the absolute magnitude of 
the negative values have declined.  This implies that either the emerging market currencies have 
become more stable and appreciated relative to the U.S. dollar in the post-liberalization period, 
or their interest rates have increased over time relative to equivalent rates in the U.S.  An 
examination of the data lends more support to the latter as most countries experienced significant 
depreciation up to the end of the sample. This was accompanied by increasing interest rates in 
several cases, perhaps in pursuit of an “interest rate defense” of the local currency (e.g., Flood 
and Rose (2001)).    
  Column 3 also shows that several currencies of several countries (Colombia, India, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey) have mean excess returns significantly different from 
zero in one period or another, at least at the 10% level.  Interestingly only in the cases of 
Colombia, India, and Pakistan can we conclude that average excess currency returns are different 
in the pre- and post-liberalization periods.  Care must be exercised in interpreting these numbers 
however, given that they represent averages of series that are time varying and are characterized 
by both large negative and positive values (columns 4, 5).  Thus, in any one period there might 
be significant deviation from UIRP, even if it holds on average over the long term.  If markets 
are integrated, then UIRP should hold on a period-by-period basis, and any systematic deviation 
would be of concern to the investor.  Further, even if there is no difference in average excess 
returns between the two sub-periods it would be incorrect to conclude that capital market 
liberalization does not impact deviations from UIRP because the impact is not necessarily in the 
  15magnitude of the excess returns but rather in the compensation for risk that investors extract 
from this excess return. 
  The standard deviations for excess currency returns are reported in column 6.  As is the 
case for the mean excess returns the first number for each country corresponds to the pre-
liberalization period with the second number corresponding to the post-liberalization period.   
Similar to the results for emerging market equity returns (see for e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 
2000), Henry (2000)) emerging market currency returns are characterized by high volatility with 
standard deviations from approximately 12% annually to 77%.  Column 6 also displays 
additional interesting results.  For two of the Latin American countries (Chile and Mexico) there 
is a sharp decline in the volatility of the excess currency returns going from the first sub-period 
to the second.  The reverse holds for Colombia.  In comparison, for the Asian countries, with the 
exception of India, there is a marked increase in the standard deviation in the post-liberalization 
period.  Turkey also demonstrates this increase in volatility in the post-liberalization period.  
This increase in volatility is probably due to the Asian currency crisis that occurred in 1997.    
  The final two columns of Table 2 contain skewness and kurtosis statistics. Similar to the 
standard deviation results going from the pre- to the post-liberalization period, there is a decline 
in both statistics for Chile and Mexico but an increase for Colombia, while there is an increase 
for the Asian countries and Turkey.  As is customary for emerging market asset returns, Panel B 
and Panel C show that the excess currency returns are characterized by autocorrelation. There are 
no apparent differences across regions and across sub-periods. 
  Taken together the results presented so far indicate that emerging equity markets are 
characterized by deviations from URIP, and more important for the current study, the deviation 
seems to be significantly impacted by capital market liberalization.  And as indicated only for the 
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statistically significant across the pre- and post-liberalization periods.  However, by looking at 
averages the impact of capital market liberalization on deviations from UIRP is not fully 
discernible.  Figure 1a through 1i plot the excess currency returns for each of the eight countries 
for both pre- and post-liberalization.  Inspection of these figures indicates that this is in fact the 
case.  For each country the figures display a distinct and important difference in the excess 
currency returns for both periods. 
  The Latin American countries show a relatively large increase in both the magnitude and 
variation of excess currency returns in the post-liberalization period compared to the pre-
liberalization period. This finding is surprising given that, a priori, we expected that 
liberalization of the capital markets would lead to a decline in the mean and volatility of the 
excess currency returns.  
  For the Asian countries the behavior of excess currency returns is demonstrably different 
from that displayed by Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.  Specifically, Figures 1d to 1h show that in 
general the excess currency returns are much more dynamic in the first sub-period than in the 
second.  It should be noted however, that this general pattern changes around the Asian financial 
crisis.  As is expected, for each country there is a substantial increase in the variability of the 
excess returns at the onset of the financial crisis.  This variability then tapers off over the next six 
to 18 months depending on the particular country.  
 Figure  1i displays Turkey’s excess currency returns for both the pre- and post-
liberalization sub-periods.  Similar patterns to those of the Asian countries are displayed.  This 
similarity in the movement of excess currency returns across the pre- and post-liberalization 
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countries.  
In summary, Figures 1a through 1i provide strong evidence that excess currency returns 
are time varying in nature, are frequently significantly different from zero and are different 
across the pre- and post-liberalization sub-periods.  This evidence together with the results 
presented in Table 2 indicates that UIRP does not hold and that deviations from UIRP is 
significantly affected by liberalization of a country’s capital market.  Next we examine whether 
the excess currency returns (deviation from UIRP) is due to non-diversifiable risk. 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
Ferson and Harvey (1993), and others, show that conditionally expected returns are 
driven by both time-varying betas and risk factors.  We therefore specify the asset pricing model 
to capture these characteristics of the data.  Table 3 reports summary statistics of the instruments 
used to capture this time variation of the risk factors.  These data are used extensively in asset 
pricing tests (see, e.g., Fama and French (1993), and Eckbo et al. (2000)) and the summary 
statistics are presented here for completeness. 
Table 4 provides evidence as to the predictability of the risk factors and therefore if they 
are time varying.  The usefulness of this is that if they are time varying, the currency excess 
returns can be expressed as a function of both a time-varying beta and time-varying factor.  As is 
shown in Table 4, the results indicate that our information instruments have substantial 
predictive ability for each country and across both sub-periods.  It is worth noting that the 
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instruments contribute to the time variation of the factors.
6  
Results pertaining as to whether or not deviation from UIRP, as measured by excess 
currency returns, has a systematic risk component and if this has changed as a result of 
liberalization are reported in Table 5.  These results are presented in three groupings.  Each 
grouping reports the sample average of the time-varying betas for each of the three risk factors 
for both the pre- and post-liberalization periods.  It must be noted that the traditional method of 
presenting coefficient estimates is not applicable here given that the coefficient for each factor is 
allowed to vary on a period-by-period basis.  Additionally, we report the minimum and 
maximum of the coefficients, their standard deviations (and an indication of their statistical 
significance), and the p-value for the difference in the means of the betas across the two sub-
periods.   
  The final statistic that is reported in Table 5 is the model’s average pricing error.  This 
measure is an un-standardized residual from the excess currency returns equation (equation 2) 
and represents the portion of the currency excess returns (deviations from UIRP) not explained 
by the model.  The importance of this measure is that when compared with the average excess 
currency returns (in Table 2) it provides an indication of how well the excess return is explained 
by the conditional asset pricing model.  For example, in the case of Chile (second column) the 
average excess return is 0.197% and the error is 0.013%.  This indicates that the model has 
“explained” 0.184% of the excess returns.  Stated differently, given the riskiness of Chile’s 
                                                 
6 Note that the factors display varying levels of predictability across the different countries because although a 
common set of instruments is used in each country model the full “information set” for each model contains the 
particular country’s currency excess returns and its contribution to the variance-covariance matrix of the system.   
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is 0.184% while the realized average excess return is 0.197%. 
  The results indicate that in almost all cases we can reject the null hypothesis that the betas 
are not significantly different from zero.  This indicates that a part of the currency excess returns 
is compensation for bearing systematic risk.  Except in the case of India, there is a statistical and 
in most cases an economical difference in the average market beta across the pre- and post-
liberalization periods.  We interpret the market beta in the usual manner and contend that a 
negative market beta indicates that the country’s currency returns provide the U.S. investor with 
the benefits of diversification.  The average size (SMB) beta (except for Malaysia) and the HML 
beta (except for Thailand) are also significantly different across sub-periods.  These findings 
provide strong support for the notion that deviation from UIRP is systematic in nature and that 
liberalization of capital markets significantly impacts the nature of the risk premium.  Next we 
present a closer examination of each of the countries studied. 
 
Chile 
The average value of the market beta in the pre-liberalization period is –0.035 while for 
the post-liberalization period it becomes positive with a value of 0.069.  This is an increase in 
absolute value of about 100%.  The negative beta in the first period suggests that currency 
deposits in Chile provides benefits of international portfolio diversification to U.S. equity 
investors.  As is shown in Table 5, a difference in means test is significant at the 1% level.  The 
increase in the market beta is evident in Figure 2. The first sub-period, although displaying some 
variation, is relatively stable except for a major spike around July 1982 that is probably due to 
either the Latin American debt crisis and/or the fact that Chile also floated its currency around 
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shows a gradual increase in the first 18 months, fluctuates between 0.08 and 0.16 over the next 
two years then tapers off to approximately 0.01 for the remainder of the period.  
  Similar results are also displayed by the size and value betas.  Interestingly, while the size 
beta is generally positive throughout the post-liberalization period it shows a steady decrease in 
magnitude even though its variation increases.  In contrast, the value beta increases sharply in 
size and volatility though it is generally negative.  The positive size beta suggests that following 
liberalization investors require a large but declining risk premium for financial distress as 
proxied by SMB.  The negative value beta leads to a lower expected excess return in both the 
pre- and post-liberalization periods and suggests that investors view the Chilean economy as 
having superior growth opportunities.  This reflects the experience of the Chilean economy over 
much of the 1980s and 1990s (Altig and Humpage (1999)). 
    The significant positive market and size betas in the second sub-period indicate that 
Chile’s currency market is not integrated in the world capital market, as in that case U.S. 
investors should not require a positive and significant risk premium. However, from the graphs 
of the betas it is clear that the results are driven primarily by the period before 1996. That is, 
consistent with the equity market results of Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Chile appeared to be 
becoming less integrated in the first three years after liberalization. This trend seems to be 
reversed starting in 1996. The latter supports Bekaert et al. (2002) that integration is frequently 
effective only after three or so years after the official liberalization.  
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In the pre-liberalization period the average value of the market beta is 0.009, while for 
the post-liberalization period it is 0.013. The t-test in Table 5 indicates that they are significantly 
different at the 1% level. Though both betas are economically small, what is of more significance 
is the upward trend in the post-liberalization period that is evident in Figure 3. This follows a 
steep drop in the market beta in early 1994. The cause of this is not clear as in the first half of the 
year there were some new restrictions imposed on both local and foreign investors and firms 
(see, e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (1998)).  
While the size beta is generally positive throughout the pre-liberalization period it 
becomes negative after liberalization with increased volatility.  The negative beta suggests that 
U.S. investors’ fear of financial distress from investing in Colombia had declined significantly in 
this period of reform.  In contrast, the value beta increases sharply in size to become positive 
throughout most of the sample period although towards the end of the period it is trending 
downwards, suggesting that investors view the Colombian economy as about to experience 
growth perhaps as a result of the earlier reforms.   
Considering the increase in the market and value betas and the positive risk premium 
related to the lack of growth opportunities in the post-liberalization period, we conclude that 
Colombia is not internationally integrated. 
 
Mexico 
The results for Mexico are broadly similar to those of Chile.  In the pre-liberalization 
period the market beta is negative.  In the second sub-period it is positive with an inverted “U” 
shape (Figure 4), indicating that in the first few years after liberalization the currency market 
  22became less integrated (see, e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (1995)) but is becoming more integrated in 
the latter years.  The beta fluctuates significantly around the 1994 peso crash and increases 
around the time of the Brazilian currency crisis of the fourth quarter 1998.  These results suggest 
that in the first sub-period the currency market provided U. S. investors with diversification 
benefits, while in the second sub-period, investors perceived a loss of diversification benefits and 
therefore required positive compensation. 
The SMB beta has an average value of 0.029 in the first sub-period and increases to 0.146 
in the post-liberalization period. Although the difference in coefficients is statistically 
significant, in looking at Figure 4 it appears that this difference is primarily driven by the impact 
of the Latin American currency crises.  This result is consistent with the finding by Hunter 
(2002) that U.S. investors in Latin American depositary receipts (ADRs) require larger 
compensation for holding these assets following the peso crash.  The value beta has an average 
of 0.127 in the first sub-period and -0.182 in the post liberalization period, suggesting that in the 
pre-liberalization period there is a paucity of growth opportunities, while in the post-
liberalization period there is a substantial increase in growth opportunities. This may be because 
Mexico became the largest Latin American recipient of U.S. foreign portfolio investments after 
liberalization and their joining the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. 
Overall, the results indicate that the Mexican currency market is not internationally 
integrated as investors continue to demand a positive risk premium for exposure to market and 
financial distress risks. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that segmentation increases around 
currency crises. The latter is consistent with the findings of Hunter (2002) that currency crises 
increases equity market segmentation. 
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The average coefficient for the market beta is 0.013 and 0.049 in the pre- and post-
liberalization periods.  In contrast to the Latin American markets, the t-test indicates that 
statistically there is no difference across the sub-periods.  This similarity across regimes is 
evident in Figure 5, with notable exceptions around October 1995, April 1996 and the period of 
the Asian crisis.   
The average size coefficient is 0.124 in the pre-liberalization period and decreases to –
0.064 in the post liberalization period.  For the value beta the coefficient decreases in magnitude 
from –0.136 to –0.26.  In contrast to the market beta, both the size and value betas are 
statistically different across the two sub-periods.  The reduction in coefficients is also apparent in 
Figure 5.  It should be noted that not only is there a reduction in the average size of the 
coefficients, but there is also a marked decline in their volatility across both sub-periods.  These 
results suggest that the liberalization of capital markets leads to a reduction in the compensation 
required by investors, an indication that India is becoming more integrated in the 1990s. 
 
Korea 
  There is an economically significant increase in the mean excess currency returns 
moving from the pre- to the post-liberalization periods, even though the latter is influenced 
largely by the Asian crisis.  This is accompanied by a dramatic increase in the average market 
beta from 0.012 to 0.198 and in the default (SMB) risk beta from –0.038 to 0.081.  These results 
indicate that following liberalization investors required an increase in the risk premiums for both 
market and default risks.  On the other hand, the beta associated with the HML factor, which is a 
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in contrast to size and market risks, investors require less compensation following liberalization. 
These changes in the pre- and post-liberalization periods are also apparent in Figure 6. 
Overall, these results suggest that for Korea, excess currency returns are time varying and are 
characterized by significant differences across the two sub-periods.  Further, the results also 
show that the deviation from UIRP is systematic in nature and though it is significantly affected 
by capital market liberalization the deviation is not eliminated by liberalization. 
We conclude, therefore, that Korea has not become integrated in the post-liberalization 
period, even though an inspection of the betas suggest that in the period after June 1996 it is 
becoming more integrated notwithstanding the impact of the Asian crisis. The results for Korea 
are surprising given that Korea is one of the most developed emerging markets. It is a very liquid 
market, has relatively high market capitalization, and lists over 30 country funds with a fairly 
long history (Bekaert and Harvey (1995)). Our results are clearly different from those of Bekaert 
and Harvey who find that Korea is integrated. This difference points to the problem of drawing 
conclusions solely on the basis of tests of integration of equity markets.  
 
Malaysia 
The results for Malaysia indicate that excess currency returns are significantly affected by 
capital market liberalization.  The average of the market beta has gone from positive to negative, 
the mean financial distress (SMB) beta has become more negative, and the mean growth 
opportunity (HML) beta has become positive.  However, only the market and HML coefficients 
are statistically different across the two sub-periods, suggesting that the perception of the 
probability of default has not changed significantly across the sub-periods. The negative market 
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international diversification and are willing to give up some risk premium in exchange for these 
benefits. It is clear, however, that they perceive a loss of growth opportunities as a result of the 
Asian crisis. 
An inspection of Figure 7 shows that the most significant deviation from UIRP in the 
post-liberalization period occurred during the Asian crisis.  In fact, excluding the Asian crisis 
there appears to be no significant difference in the currency excess returns in the second sub-
period relative to the first. That is, the deviation seems to be within a ± 5% band from the start of 
the sample up to the Asian crisis. However, further statistical analyses suggest that the mean 
excess return of the second sub-period excluding the crisis is positive and economically different 
from the average for the pre-liberalization period.  There are similar differences between the 
market and HML betas. For instance, closer inspection of the graphs indicate that the range of 
the HML beta in the second sub-period leading up to the crisis is ± 0.60, compared to –0.15 to 
+0.05 in the pre-liberalization period.   
Overall, these results indicate that, independent of the Asian currency crisis, liberalization 
has significantly impacted the deviation from UIRP and the component that is required as 
compensation for bearing risk. It appears as if the Asian crisis interrupted a strong convergence 
to integration. A close inspection of the graphs of the excess returns and betas clearly indicates 
that in the nearly 18 months after the crisis the currency excess returns are on average zero.  
 
Pakistan 
The average coefficient on all three risk factors has increased in magnitude from the first 
sub-period to the second.  These results suggest that on average deviation from UIRP is more 
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of a non-diversifiable component in deviation from UIRP in the post-liberalization period is also 
apparent on inspection of Figure 8. Figure 8 shows that for all three risk factors the average 
coefficients are much larger and are characterized by much wider variations. Additionally, it is 
also apparent that investors demand a higher compensation for both market and size risk in the 
post-liberalization period and a reduction in compensation for HML risk.  This is consistent with 
the notion that liberalization increases future growth opportunities (see, e.g., Henry (2000) and 
Bekaert and Harvey (2000)), while at the same time increasing default risk as evidenced by the 
Asian and Russian financial crisis.  
However, it does appear that Pakistan is becoming more integrated after 1996 as the risk 
premium required for exposure to market and financial distress risks begin to decline after 
peaking in 1995 and the HML beta is tapering off to the pre-liberalization average.  
 
Thailand 
The model estimates show that on average there is a relatively large increase (decrease), 
both economically and statistically in the average coefficient of the market (size) risk factor.  
These results are consistent with the notion that deviation from UIRP is due to systematic risk 
and that this relationship is significantly affected by the liberalization of capital markets.  In 
contrast, the average coefficient on the risk factor proxying for future growth opportunities 
remains virtually unchanged. 
  Inspection of Figure 9 reveals some characteristics of the coefficients that are not 
apparent by the average value reported in Table 5.   First it is clear that the increase in the size of 
the average market beta going from the pre- to the post-liberalization period reported in Table 5 
  27is directly related to the Asian financial crisis.
7  Excluding the crisis period there is a decline in 
the mean post-liberalization coefficient from 0.121 to 0.097.  However, the latter average beta is 
also statistically significantly different (at less than the 1% level) from the pre-liberalization 
mean beta (0.059). Similarly, excluding the crisis, the average size beta increases from 0.025 to 
0.049, which is statistically different from the pre-liberalization average of 0.088.  
The mean of the HML coefficients is also impacted by the Asian crisis.  The results 
reported in Table 5 indicate that the average coefficient is the same across both sub-periods.  
This is somewhat misleading because of the inclusion of the crisis.  The average HML beta in the 
post-liberalization period before the crisis is -0.130, which is significantly different from the pre-
liberalization average (-0.088).  Incidentally, the mean pre-crisis excess return in the second sub-
period is 0.317, which is significantly different from the pre-liberalization mean at the 0.07 level.  
Taken together these results suggest that in general deviations from UIRP are due to 
systematic risks and that the compensation required for bearing these risks is significantly 
affected by capital market liberalization. Given that the market and size betas are significant and 
positive and the increase in the market beta when we exclude the crisis, we conclude that 
Thailand is not integrated. However, the large negative HML beta and the pre-crisis decline in 
the mean SMB beta in the post-liberalization period are good indicators of a trend towards 
integration. 
 
                                                 
7 The Asian crisis also led to a change of currency regime from fixed to floating.   Thus the impact of the crisis may 
also be reflecting this change in currency regimes.  However, it should be noted that this occurred 10 years after the 
liberalization, thus it is unlikely that our findings are due to this. 
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The model estimates for Turkey indicate a dramatic change in the average of the 
coefficients between the pre- and post-liberalization periods for both market and size risks.   
Specifically the coefficients change from positive to negative following liberalization.  The 
negative coefficients in the post-liberalization period suggest that on average investors required 
less (negative) compensation for systematic risk attributed to the market and financial distress.  
This implies that in comparison to the first sub-period there are perceived diversification benefits 
from investing in Turkey and a substantial reduction in compensation for financial distress.  The 
latter finding may be due to an increase in Turkey’s fiscal responsibility as it seeks to gain 
acceptance into the Euro zone.  Unlike the market and size beta the value beta is negative in the 
first sub-period suggesting that, on average, during this period investors perceived Turkey as 
having good future growth opportunities.  Following liberalization, although still negative, the 
average beta is now smaller in absolute magnitude. This is a bit surprising given Turkey’s bid to 
become part of the European Monetary Union (EMU).  Perhaps, it is due to the austerity of the 
economic programs being instituted in order to qualify. 
Inspection of Figure 10 indicates results that are in general consistent with those reported 
in Table 5.  They show that there is a dramatic decline in both the size and fluctuation of the 
market and size coefficients (except for the spike around the first half of 1994).  In contrast, for 
the value beta there is a reduction in the size of the coefficient.  However, this is accompanied by 
an increase in its volatility.  Surprisingly, it appears that the compensation required by investors 
is not substantially affected by the Asian crisis.  In fact it appears as if there may be a reduction 
in the magnitude and variation in the mean of all three coefficients following the Asian crisis.  
  29This may be because investors are now regarding Turkey as becoming more aligned to Europe, 
given its effort to join the EMU.  
It appears that Turkey has benefited substantially from liberalization. The reduction in the 
excess currency returns as a result of the negative market and size betas in the second sub-period 
suggests that it has become integrated.  
 
6.   Conclusion 
In this paper we use monthly data to establish that emerging markets typically experience 
significant deviations from UIRP. We then examine whether these deviations are characterized 
by time-varying risk premiums and the extent to which this component of excess returns is 
affected by the liberalization of the country’s capital market. We hypothesize that if the 
emerging market became integrated following capital market liberalization, then U.S. investors 
will not require a positive and significant risk premium for exposure to risks from investing in 
these countries’ currencies.  
 Estimation results indicate that deviations from UIRP are indeed characterized by a time-
varying component that is compensation for non-diversifiable risks.  The results also show that 
the deviations from UIRP are significantly affected by the liberalization of capital markets.   
Interestingly, we find that the impact is regional in nature.  Specifically, we find that following 
liberalization of the capital markets of the Latin American countries analyzed, the systematic 
component of deviations from UIRP increased.  On the other hand, for the Asian countries 
examined and Turkey, apart from the financial crisis that occurred in 1997, there is a general 
decline in excess currency returns and the component that is compensation for non-diversifiable 
risk. Further, we also show that the impact of liberalization on the systematic component of 
  30currency excess returns is also significant even if we exclude the currency crisis.  However, it is 
clear that currency crises increase emerging market segmentation. Future studies should examine 
the underlying forces that resulted in the contrasting effects of liberalization on UIRP across 
Latin American and Asian countries. 
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  34Table 1 Changes to Interest and Exchange Rate Regimes in Liberalized Emerging Markets  




Country Lib.  Date  Interest Rates  Exchange Rates 
Argentina  November 1989  Deregulation of deposit rates in 1987 but some 
loan rates still regulated. 
Exchange and capital controls eliminated in 1991; 
Brazil    Loan (Deposit) rates fully liberalized in 1988 
(1989). 
Controls on capital outflows (inflows) increased  
(decreased) in 1990s. Interbank foreign exchange 
market allowed March 1990.  
Chile   January 1992    Minimum holding period for investments dropped to 
one year, peso revalued 5% in January 1992; change in 
the reference currency for the peso in July 1992; peso 
pegged to three currencies. 
Colombia  February 1991  Domestic firms could borrow from foreign 
sources and domestic sources lend to 
foreigners operating locally starting in 1991. 
Deregulation of the peso in October 1991 lead to free 
float and reduced controls; September 1993 pesos no 
longer needed to be converted to U.S. dollars before 
conversion to other currencies; use of dollar allowed 
for domestic transactions;  
Mexico  May 1989  Deposit (loan) rates decontrolled 1988-1989 
(1988). 
Reduction of controls on foreign portfolio flows in 
1989; restrictions on foreign direct flows rationalized 
in 1989; unification of dual exchange rate system in 
November 1991. 
India  November 1992  Simplification of regulated interest rates in 
1992; rate controls on CDs and commercial 
paper lifted in 1993; other interest rate 
liberalizations in 1994, 1995. 
Easing of restrictions on direct and portfolio flows in 
1991; dual rate system introduced March 1992; eased 
tax restrictions in September 1992 to attract inflows; 
rates unified in 1993-1994. 
Korea  January 1992  Process of interest rate deregulation started in 
the 1990s completed by 1995. 
Market average exchange rate system introduced 
March 1990. 
Malaysia  Dec 1988  Interest rate controls reintroduced in mid 
1980s lifted by 1991. 
Deregulation of foreign direct and portfolio flows by 
mid 1980s. 
Pakistan  February 1991  Interest rates freed in 1995.  Rupee made convertible in July 1994. 
Thailand  September 1 987  Abolished all ceilings on deposit rates in 1990; 
removed loan rate ceilings in 1992.  
 
Turkey  July 1989  Deposit rate ceilings eliminated n 1988.  Capital flows liberalized in 1989. 
 
Source:   
 
Beim, D. O. and C. W. Calomiris, 2001, Emerging Financial Markets, McGraw Hill Irwin, NY. 
Bekaert, G., 1995, “Market Integration and Investment Barriers in Emerging Equity Markets,” World Bank Economic Review, Table 8. 
Bekaert, G., and C. Harvey, 1998 “Capital Flows and the Behavior of Emerging Market Equity Returns,” NBER working paper # 6669. 
Bekaert, G., C. Harvey, and R. Lumsdaine, 2002, “Dating the Integration of World Equity Markets,” forthcoming Journal of Financial 
Economics. 
  35Table 2                     Summary Statistics of Currency Excess Returns  
Currency excess returns are computed as follows. At the beginning of the month a U.S. dollar is converted to local currency at the spot exchange 
rate against the U.S. dollar and deposited in the country of reference. At the end of the month the local currency proceeds are converted to U.S. 
dollars at the end-of-month spot exchange rate. The return on this currency deposit is then compared to the one-month return on the matching 
U.S. dollar deposit in the U.S. to compute the currency excess return. Hence, all returns are in U.S. dollar terms and are monthly percentage 
returns. Q(x) is the Ljung-Box Q statistic  (p-value) from a test for autocorrelation up to lag x. The data used in this study begin in December 
1979 (except for Colombia [January 1986, 177 obs.], Mexico [December 1981, 226 obs.]), and ends in September 2000 (except for India [May 
1998, 222 obs.]), for a total of 250 monthly returns. The first five (5) months of each sub-period is lost through lagging to initiate the GARCH 









Mean (%)  Min  Max  Std Dev  Skewness    Excess 
Kurtosis 


























6.944   
0.849   
60.37 














































































































Pre-Liberalization Auto-correlations of Currency Excess Returns 
 
 Chile  Colombia  Mexico    India  Korea Malaysia Pakistan  Thailand  Turkey 
                
r (1)  0.033    0.667    -0.065  0.028   0.277   0.147   0.360    0.010    0.030  
r (2)  0.133    0.487    -0.018  0.039   0.270   0.014   0.228    0.113    0.087  












































Post-Liberalization Auto-correlations of Currency Excess Returns 
 
 Chile  Colombia  Mexico  India Korea  Malaysia Pakistan    Thailand  Turkey 
              
r (1)  0.084    0.121    -0.042  0.034   0.256   0.113   0.352    0.035    0.063  
r (2)  0.166    0.143    0.001   0.180   0.253   0.006   0.225    0.118    0.115  










































 Bold (shaded) indicates excess currency returns that are significantly different from zero at the 5% (10%) levels.  
a Indicates difference in excess currency returns across pre- and post-liberalization periods. 
            
  36Table 3                Summary Statistics of the Risk Factors and Information Variables  
The risk factors are the Fama-French factors, the U.S. market (USMKT), SMB, and HML. The instruments are a constant, the change in the U.S. 
default premium (∆DEFAULT), measured as the yield differential between Moody’s Baa and AAA corporate bonds, the U.S. term premium 
(TERM), measured as the difference in yield between the10-year Treasury note and the three-month Treasury bill, the riskfree rate (RFREE), the 
return on the one-month Treasury bill, and the U.S. market portfolio (USMKT). Each instrument is lagged one period relative to the factor 
returns. Q(x) is the Ljung-Box Q statistic  (p-value) from a test for autocorrelation up to lag x. The number on top represents the pre-liberalization 
(145 obs.) and the one below, the post-liberalization (105 obs.) period. Since different markets had different liberalization date this split in the 
sample represents roughly the average market. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                         
Variable     Mean  Std Dev  Autocorrelation  Ljung-Box (p-value) 
     r (1)  r (2)  r (3)  LB: Q(3)  LB:Q(12) 
USMKT 
 














SMB  0.010    
0.179  
2.392    
2.443  
0.172
a   









HML  0.238    
0.584  




0.157   
0.067   
0.021   





































RFREE   0.686    
0.723  













a   Indicate significance at the 5% level.  The standard error of the first order autocorrelation in the firsr period is approximately 0.0814 and 0.0976 
in the second sub-period. * These are annualized yields. All others represent monthly measures.  
 
  37Table 4                                        Predictability of the Factors  
The estimated model is:  it t i t i i it z a z a a r ε + + + + = − − 1 4 4 1 1 1 0 ...  for i = Market, SMB, and HML, respectively, from equations (4) to 
(6). The vector of instruments Z includes a constant, the change in the U.S. default premium measured as the yield differential between Moody’s 
Baa and AAA corporate bonds (∆DEFAULT), the U.S. term premium (TERM) measured as the difference in yield between the10-year Treasury 
note and the three-month Treasury bill, the riskfree rate (RFREE) measured as the return on the one-month Treasury bill, and the U.S. market 
portfolio (USMKT). All instruments are lagged one month relative to the factors.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are based on a QML 
estimation robust to non-normality of the residuals. LB(x) is the Ljung-Box chi-squared statistic for testing the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation up to the xth lag. The first column for each market represents the pre-liberalization and the second the post-liberalization period. 
 
  Chile  Chile Colo. Colo. Mexico  Mexico  India  India  Korea Korea 
MARKET               






























 0.018    
(0.038) 


















 0.168    
(0.475) 










RFREE{1}  -2.584 
(1.975) 






-1.633   
(3.326)  
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 0.350    
(0.210) 
 0.048  
(0.027)  
















 0.881    
(1.369)  










USMKT {1}   0.233  
(0.044) 






 0.226   
(0.059) 










               
HML               








-1.629   
(0.989) 






































































 1.753  
(3.822)  




















               
Log-likelihood  -855.00  -587.53 -207.10 -690.16 -608.76 -825.04 -865.15  -272.71 -673.36  -660.69 
  
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level. Shaded numbers indicate significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
  38Table 4 Cont’d                                  Predictability of the Factors   
The estimated model is:  it t i t i i it z a z a a r ε + + + + = − − 1 4 4 1 1 1 0 ...  for i = Market, SMB, and HML, respectively, from equations (4) to 
(6). The vector of instruments Z includes a constant, the change in the U.S. default premium measured as the yield differential between Moody’s 
Baa and AAA corporate bonds (∆DEFAULT), the U.S. term premium (TERM) measured as the difference in yield between the10-year Treasury 
note and the three-month Treasury bill, the riskfree rate (RFREE) measured as the return on the one-month Treasury bill, and the U.S. market 
portfolio (USMKT). All instruments are lagged one month relative to the factors. All standard errors in Panel A are based on a QML estimation 
robust to non-normality of the residuals. LB(x) is the Ljung-Box chi-squared statistic for testing the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation up to 
the xth lag. The first column for each market represents the pre-liberalization and the second the post-liberalization period. 
 
  Malaysia  Malaysia Thailand Thailand Pakistan  Pakistan  Turkey  Turkey 
USMKT Factor              
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HML Factor              


















































































              
Log-likelihood  -546.01  -781.15 -472.96 -854.33 -674.17  -646.90  -656.97  -792.50 
 
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level. Shaded numbers indicate significance at the 10% level. 
 Table 5        Summary Statistics of the Excess Returns, Betas, and Pricing Errors  
′ ′ ′ The estimated model equation (2):  it hml t hml smb t smb mkt t mkt it r ε β β β + + = − + − − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( A z A z A z  for i equal the currency excess returns. β is the conditional covariance between the 
currency excess returns and the respective factor divided by the conditional variance of the factor. The reported value is the mean beta over the sample period. The term in (bracket) represents the 
conditional returns on (time-varying realization of) the factor. The vector of instruments Z includes a constant, the change in the U.S. default premium measured as the yield differential between 
Moody’s Baa and AAA corporate bonds (∆DEFAULT), the U.S. term premium (TERM) measured as the difference in yield between the10-year Treasury note and the three-month Treasury bill, the 
riskfree rate (RFREE) measured as the return on the one-month Treasury bill, and the U.S. market portfolio. All instruments are lagged one month. All standard errors in Panel A are based on a QML 
estimation robust to non-normality of the residuals. LB(x) is the Ljung-Box chi-squared statistic for testing the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation up to the xth lag.  
 
                                     
                                 
                                   
                                     
                                     
    
             
                 
                  
                  
                         
                                   
                                   
                                     
 
                 
                 
                  
                  
                                     
                                   
                                   
                                     
  
                       
                 
                  




































  Mean Betas 
    Market
 
-0.035 0.069 0.009 0.013 -0.009 0.230 0.013 0.049  0.017 0.198 0.020 -0.054 0.006 0.058 0.059 0.121 0.038 -0.083
Std   0.018   0.045 0.005 0.015 0.019 0.082 0.001 0.241     0.008 0.105 0.019 0.189 0.011 0.021 0.003 0.139 0.018 0.127
Min -0.174 -0.017 -0.013 -0.027 -0.028 0.065 0.012 -0.546 0.001 0.041 -0.009 -1.647 -0.048 0.021 0.049 -0.777 -0.007 -0.535

























       
T-Test

















   
 
                             
  SMB
 
0.107  0.079  0.016  -0.170 0.029 0.146 0.124 -0.064  -0.038 0.081 -0.029 -0.062 0.045 0.075 0.088 0.025 0.006 -0.178 
Std 0.215 0.060 0.078 0.084 0.052 0.260 0.163 0.448 0.056 0.051 0.037 0.260 0.085 0.052 0.025 0.217 0.087 0.394
































  0.000 
 
  0.002 
 














-0.139 -0.016 -0.026 0.015 0.127 -0.182 -0.136 -0.026  -0.018 -0.399 -0.064 0.067 -0.020 -0.073 -0.088 -0.088 -0.164 -0.080
Std 0.162 0.030 0.014 0.015 0.064 0.298 0.163 0.209 0.079 0.152 0.050 0.327 0.006 0.024 0.013 0.202 0.094 0.260
Min -1.262 -0.099 -0.085 -0.032 -0.245 -2.230 -1.020 -1.147 -0.206 -0.682 -0.145 -0.724 -0.041 -0.122 -0.108 -0.537 -0.370 -1.058 































  0.000 
 

















Excess Return   -0.153 0.197 -0.206   0.485 -1.114 0.027 -0.666 -0.129 -0.068 0.112 -0.353 -0.141 -0.751 -0.285 -0.096 0.005 -0.959 -0.337
Pricing Error 
a 
(Std of error)  
0.120   
2.930 












-0.180   
1.942 
-0.037   
3.314 
-0.048   
3.323 
-0.097   
2.640 
-0.175   
2.633 
-0.293   
1.639 
-0.253   
1.543 
0.001   
3.024 
-0.129   
3.009 
-0.328   
4.634 
-0.388   
4.609 
 
Betas in bold indicate significance at least at the 5% level. *T-Test is the test of the null hypothesis that the means of the respective beta are equal before (first column) and after (second column) 
liberalization. Significant p-values (at the 1% level) are in bold. 
aPricing Error is the unstandardized residual from equation (2). It represents the portion of the currency excess returns not explained by 
the factors. A comparison of the pricing errors with the mean excess returns (repeated in the table for convenience) reflects how well risk premium explains the currency excess returns. 


















































































           






















































































































































































           



















Figure 1b.                                                                                                                                                                                                  
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Figure 1d. 

















































































             






































































































































             



































































































































































             


































































































            



































































































































































            





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































            




















































































































































































































   
Figure 3 Time-Varying Betas for Colombia. 
                   
 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Time-Varying Betas for Mexico. 
 







































































































































































































































































































                 










































































Figure 5. Time-Varying Betas for India. 
 





































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6. Time-Varying Betas for Korea. 
 





































































































                





















































































































































































Figure 7. Time-Varying Betas for Malaysia. 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8. Time-Varying Betas for Pakistan. 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9. Time-Varying Betas for Thailand. 




















































































































































































































































































        
Figure 10. Time-Varying Betas for Turkey. 
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